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Introduction and summary
The recent financial crisis highlighted some of the 
potential problems associated with over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives markets. Prior to the financial crisis 
of 2008, the over-the-counter market was not required 
to “clear” transactions. This changed with the signing 
of the new financial reform legislation, the Dodd–Frank 
Act, on July 21, 2010. Going forward, most OTC deriv-
atives will be cleared through a particular set of insti-
tutional arrangements: a regulated clearinghouse. 
The financial crisis exposed some significant cracks 
in the OTC derivatives markets,1 as exemplified by the 
case of insurance company AIG. We now know that 
AIG sold a gigantic amount of OTC credit default swaps 
(insurance contracts against defaults), with notional 
value over $440 billion. Since AIG did not take posi-
tions to offset their credit default swap exposure, one 
might conjecture that this could cause problems for 
AIG and financial markets.2 Namely, if the economy 
were hit by an adverse aggregate shock that either 
caused a very large number of swap payouts to move 
against AIG or weakened its balance sheet (or both), 
then AIG may not have the funds to perform on its OTC 
obligations. And even if it did have the funds, AIG may 
choose to default (referred to as a strategic default) 
on its credit default swap obligations. In either case, 
AIG’s counterparties would not receive the payoffs 
they were expecting, and this could have a ripple effect 
on their counterparties and the broader markets. 
In fact, during the financial crisis, AIG had to raise 
money in debt markets in order to make payments on 
the real-estate-related credit default swaps that moved 
against it. This new debt issue, along with the large 
potential future losses that AIG could experience, re-
sulted in AIG’s debt being downgraded by the credit-
rating agencies. As a result of this downgrade, AIG was 
required to post billions of dollars of collateral for its 
existing swap contracts. If the collateral had not been 
posted, then cross-default clauses in other contracts that 
AIG had written would have been activated, requiring 
AIG to settle these contracts immediately. AIG did not 
have the liquidity on hand to make all these payments, 
even though its core business activities were in fine 
shape. Without some help, AIG would have defaulted 
on its contractual obligations. Hence, the deterioration 
of the real estate market put significant financial stress 
on AIG, putting not only AIG at risk, but also AIG’s 
counterparties and their counterparties, and so on. In 
the end, collateral was posted for AIG’s positions thanks 
to a massive government bailout.3
How could this scenario have been avoided? One 
could argue that clearing AIG’s OTC derivatives con-
tracts would have prevented this negative outcome. 
Intuitively, one can think of clearing as a set of insti-
tutional arrangements that are designed to enhance con-
tractual performance. This includes a wide range of 
procedures that are implemented after a buyer and seller 
agree to the contract terms and before final settlement 
occurs. For example, if AIG had been required to clear 
its credit default swaps, it would have had to set aside 
collateral when it initially negotiated the contracts. 
When the swap contracts turned against AIG, it could 
have used the collateral to satisfy its positions, instead 
of borrowing, which, in turn, would have prevented 
the credit downgrade in its debt. 
Clearing over-the-counter derivatives 
Ed Nosal
Ed Nosal is a vice president and senior research advisor in 
the Financial Markets Group of the Economic Research 
Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The 
author would like to thank Robert Steigerwald for many 
hours of conversation on clearing and for discussing earlier 
drafts of this article. He would also like to thank Lisa Barrow, 
Jeff Campbell, Adam Cooper, Randall Costa, Godfried De Vidts, 
Darrell Duffie, Marcus Katz, Helen Koshy, Adi Li, David 
Marshall, Bob McDonald, and Ketan Patel for discussions 
and useful comments on this article.138 4Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
Clearing would also have led to greater transparency. 
Even absent posting collateral, if information regarding 
AIG’s credit default swap portfolio was publicly avail-
able, it is likely that AIG’s credit default swap portfolio 
would have been much smaller as counterparties would 
have been reluctant to enter into arrangements with such 
a highly leveraged entity. These sorts of remedies have, 
in fact, been mandated in the recent Dodd–Frank Act, 
which requires the vast majority of OTC derivatives 
to be cleared through a regulated clearinghouse.
Since clearing is a not a costless activity, two 
questions naturally arise: 1) Who should be allowed 
to participate in a clearinghouse as a clearing member?; 
and 2) Which derivative contracts should be cleared? 
A recent public policy symposium held at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago addressed these questions.4 
In this article, I review the topic of clearing from an 
economics perspective and provide the reader with a 
framework to think about clearing issues. The analysis 
can offer answers to basic but important questions, 
such as: What is clearing? Why is it important? What 
is the role of a clearing member? And why is risk 
management important for clearing? Second, I use 
this framework to review some of the ideas that were 
expressed at the symposium regarding who should be 
allowed to participate in the clearing process and what 
should be cleared. 
I conclude that: 1) although certain criteria must 
be met for individuals or institutions to participate in the 
clearing process, one criterion that should not be im-
posed is that participants must possess massive amounts 
of capital; and 2) derivative contracts negotiated by 
“end users,” corporations that hold the contracts until 
they expire, should not be treated any differently from 
contracts that are negotiated by other firms that do 
not necessarily hold them until expiration.
In the next section, I provide a simple economic 
environment to think about the clearing concept. The 
economic environment presented in this section has the 
benefit of being transparent, but at the cost of being 
quite simple. In the two following sections, I compli-
cate the environment slightly, in order to discuss the 
behavior of OTC participants and risk management—
important concepts for clearing. I describe how a 
clearinghouse might be structured. Then, I present and 
analyze the overarching themes of the symposium. 
Finally, I analyze the debate about clearinghouse mem-
bership and end-user exemptions. 
A simple model of clearing
A natural starting point for any economic investi-
gation is the Arrow–Debreu model. In the model, people 
are fully aware of all possible future contingencies 
and are able to write contracts, at the beginning of time, 
for delivery and acceptance of all possible commodities, 
where a commodity is distinguished by date, location, 
and state of the world. Contracts are mediated by mar-
kets, and there is a market and price for each com-
modity, that is, markets are “complete.” The model 
determines one of the most important concepts in 
economics, which is that of relative prices. 
Since people are fully aware of all future contin-
gencies and markets are complete, all decisions regard-
ing how much to buy and sell can be made at the 
beginning of time. Hence, all trading of contracts occurs 
at one point in time—at the beginning of time—and as 
time moves on, people simply make or accept delivery 
of commodities based on their contracts. Spot markets 
are not needed at future dates since, as the economy 
moves in time, people do not learn anything that they 
did not already know at the beginning of time. If spot 
markets opened up at a future date and trade occurred, 
that would imply that people made unexplainable mis-
takes at the beginning of time, that is, they are irrational. 
So, in the Arrow–Debreu world, all deals are struck at 
the beginning of time, and people trust one other to 
perform as specified in the contingent contracts.
The elegance and simplicity of the Arrow–Debreu 
model owe a lot to the absence of frictions in the en-
vironment. For example, people do not have to find 
one another or bargain over prices and quantities or 
worry about contractual performance. All of these fric-
tions are assumed away. In fact, the lack of frictions in 
the Arrow–Debreu model greatly simplifies the nature 
of social interaction: There is none! People observe 
equilibrium prices and trade only against their own 
budget constraint, which means that the value of what 
they buy cannot exceed the value of what they sell. The 
model, however, cannot explain a number of impor-
tant things, such as how goods are exchanged or why 
the institutions of money, banking, and clearing exist.
If we want to understand these important institu-
tions, we must introduce some explicit frictions into 
the benchmark model. For example, if we want to 
have spot markets open up over time, we can intro-
duce a search friction. If it takes time and effort to 
find and purchase goods and services, then it will not 
be possible to contract for all purchases and sales of 
commodities at the beginning of time. If there are in-
formational frictions, then contracts can only depend 
upon things that are verifiable, and complete state-
contingent contracts are not feasible. If there is a com-
mitment friction, then things like money, banks, and 
other institutions may arise to help alleviate the com-
mitment problem. And finally, we might also want to 
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explain some risk-management practices that would be 
a puzzle if a lack of commitment was the only friction. 
Although I use all of the above-mentioned frictions in 
my analysis, the commitment friction—people cannot 
commit to undertake future actions—and the infor-
mation friction play prominent roles. Now, I illustrate 
the importance of two prominent clearing processes—
novation and the posting of collateral. 
A farmer plants seeds today that produce wheat 
tomorrow, and a baker needs wheat tomorrow to bake 
bread. The price per bushel of wheat tomorrow can 
take one of two values, say, $5 or $15, that are equally 
likely. The farmer and baker are risk averse, meaning 
that they prefer to agree today to exchange one bushel 
of wheat tomorrow for tomorrow’s expected price of 
$10, as opposed to buying or selling at the spot price 
tomorrow of $5 or $15. 
The farmer and baker may be able to get their mu-
tually preferred outcomes if they enter into a forward 
contract. A forward contract is a particular kind of deriv-
ative contract, where the farmer promises to deliver a 
commodity, one bushel of wheat, tomorrow in exchange 
for $10; and the baker promises to deliver $10 tomorrow 
in exchange for the commodity. If the farmer and baker 
can commit to these promises, then they can get their 
preferred outcomes—wheat for $10—and that’s the 
end of the story. But if the farmer and baker cannot 
commit, then delivery and exchange of wheat for $10 
won’t happen. To see this, suppose that the price of 
wheat turns out to be $5 and the baker does not accept 
delivery from the farmer and, instead, purchases wheat 
on the spot market, that is, the baker strategically defaults 
on the agreement because the spot price is lower. This 
strategy gives the baker an extra $5, compared with 
the strategy of performing his contractual obligation. 
Similarly, the farmer can get a net benefit of $5 per 
bushel by strategically defaulting when the price of 
wheat tomorrow is $15. Although the farmer and baker 
would like to exchange wheat for $10 tomorrow, their 
lack of commitment prevents this from happening. If 
the farmer and baker could somehow bind themselves 
to a $10 per bushel agreement, then they would do so, 
so long as the cost of binding isn’t too great. This is 
where the notion of clearing comes in.
One way the baker and farmer may be able to 
bind themselves to the contract is for each of them to 
provide $5 of collateral upfront. The $5 of collateral 
is used to cover any losses incurred by a counterparty 
should the other counterparty fail to perform on the 
contract. For example, if the price of wheat is $5 and 
the baker reneges on the contract, then he loses his $5 
of collateral, which is given to the farmer. In effect, 
the baker pays $10 for the wheat. It would seem that 
with the introduction of collateral, the parties should not 
have an incentive to renege on their contracts. Maybe.
One tricky issue is who or what is to hold the 
collateral? Notice that the lack of commitment cannot 
be overcome by simply having each party hold the 
other’s collateral. To see this, suppose the spot price 
turns out to be $15. In this situation, the farmer does 
best for himself by selling his wheat on the spot market 
and keeping the baker’s collateral (and the baker keeps 
the farmer’s collateral). Here, one holding of collateral 
simply offsets the other one and does not guarantee 
performance. It appears that a third party is needed to 
hold the collateral of the baker and farmer.
With the introduction of a third party, things could 
work as follows. If the baker and farmer perform on 
their contract, then the third party returns the collateral 
to each of them. If, however, one party defaults and, 
as a result, harms the other party, then the third party 
can use the collateral of the nonperforming party to 
compensate the other party for his losses. For example, 
if the farmer defaults when the price of wheat is $15, 
then the third party gives the baker the farmer’s collateral, 
as well as his own. From the farmer’s point of view, 
he will pay $10 for wheat if he chooses to default, so 
he now has no incentive to default. It appears that the 
introduction of a third party that holds the collateral 
of the farmer and baker implies that they will each 
perform their contractual obligations. Maybe.
In order for the three-party arrangement to work, 
it is necessary for the third party to be able to verify 
which party reneges in the event of contractual non-
performance. Suppose that there is an informational 
friction. In the last example, where the spot price is 
$15, the farmer can renege and claim to the third party 
that he attempted to deliver the wheat to the baker 
but, for some reason, the baker refused to take deliv-
ery. The farmer, then, could argue because of the bak-
er’s nonperformance, he had no choice but to sell his 
wheat on the market and he should not forfeit his col-
lateral. Hence, if the third party cannot perfectly ob-
serve or verify the actions of the farmer and baker, 
then it will be unable to determine which party in fact 
reneged. This implies that a simple third-party mech-
anism—one that simply holds collateral—cannot 
guarantee performance.
One way around this verifiability problem is to 
have all the transactions related to the contract go 
through the third party. That is, instead of having the 
farmer deliver wheat to the baker and the baker deliver 
$10 to the farmer, all deliveries are made to the third 
party. The third party then “redelivers” the wheat and 
money according to the original contract. Under this 
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baker and farmer is discharged and replaced with two 
new contracts: one between the third party and the baker 
and another between the third party and the farmer. 
This process, called novation, makes the third party a 
central counterparty, or CCP, to the original parties 
of the contract. Notice that novation circumvents the 
verifiability problem: Since the farmer and baker make 
deliveries to the CCP, the CCP is able to determine 
whether each party has performed its obligations. The 
CCP is now able to transfer the collateral it holds to 
the appropriate party in the event of nonperformance. 
The above example illustrates how novation and 
collateral can substitute for commitment. Collateral and 
novation are only two possible ingredients or processes 
that fall under the rubric of clearing. Things like trade 
matching and confirmation (that is, checking to make 
sure party A entered into a contract and that party B is, 
in fact, on the other side of the contract), information 
warehousing (that is, compiling in an accessible manner 
the set of all the trades that have taken place), and 
risk management are also part of the clearing process.
In the example, the commitment friction is needed 
for a CCP to emerge; without it counterparties would 
not strategically default and there would be no need 
for a CCP. In practice, one might think that even if 
counterparties cannot commit, concern about their 
reputations might provide sufficient inducement for 
performance in the absence of collateral and CCPs. 
For example, a major financial player will not strate-
gically default on a contract (which is not backed by 
collateral) for only a small gain today, since that would 
damage its reputation as a reliable institution in the 
future. There is a cost associated with being viewed as 
unreliable: Potential future counterparties will choose 
not to enter into mutually beneficial contracts with an 
“unreliable” institution. (These counterparties fear the 
institution will not perform on its contract.) If a counter-
party’s concern for its reputation is sufficiently strong, 
then it will perform on its contracts even though it lacks 
commitment. If this is always the case, then my claim 
that a commitment friction is responsible for the emer-
gence of CCPs seems inappropriate. That is, reputation 
will enforce performance and a CCP is not needed. I 
now examine this issue.
Commitment and reputation
An implication of the commitment friction, as 
illustrated in the farmer–baker example, is that if 
counterparties do not post collateral with the CCP, 
then one of the counterparties will always strategically 
default. Yet, in practice, we routinely observe people 
and organizations honoring contracts that are not backed 
by collateral. We also observe contractual performance 
when collateral is posted on a bilateral basis, that is, a 
third-party CCP does not hold the collateral. Do these 
observations imply that CCPs and other clearing pro-
cesses arise for reasons other than a commitment fric-
tion? One could argue that counterparties perform on 
their contracts because they care about their reputations, 
and concern for one’s reputation outweighs the commit-
ment friction. Below, I argue that a commitment friction 
is still relevant even when parties care about their 
reputations. Hence, we should take the commitment 
friction seriously when thinking about clearing.
Here, I modify the farmer–baker example so that 
I can discuss the notion of reputation. Instead of having 
a “one-shot” contracting relationship between the 
farmer and baker, suppose that the farmer and baker 
repeatedly interact with one another. The repeated nature 
of the farmer–baker relationship may provide an incen-
tive for them to perform their contractual obligations 
even when there is a commitment friction and no 
collateral is posted. Why? Because performance today 
implies that parties will choose to contract with each 
other in the future, and this interaction is beneficial to 
both parties. Or, put another way, a party will only 
enter into a new contract with a counterparty that has 
a reputation for performing. 
To see this, suppose the farmer and baker agree 
to exchange wheat for $10. Suppose further that if the 
farmer fails to deliver wheat when the spot price is $15, 
then both parties decide that they will never enter into 
another contractual relationship with each other. The 
baker believes that if they do, then the farmer will always 
fail to deliver when the price is $15. With this belief, 
the baker has no incentive to enter into a contract with 
the farmer. So, in contrast to the original example, 
where the interaction between the farmer and baker 
was a one-shot affair, there is now a cost associated 
with not performing, which is the inability for the 
farmer and baker to stabilize the price of wheat at $10 
in the future. In deciding whether or not to perform 
when the price of wheat is $15, the farmer compares 
the immediate benefit associated with nonperformance, 
which is $5, with the future benefit associated with per-
formance, which is the ability to sell wheat at $10 in 
future periods. If the latter exceeds the former, the farmer 
will perform; otherwise he will strategically default. 
One might expect in “normal” times that counter-
parties will perform their contractual obligations even 
when no collateral is posted. This is because the benefit 
associated with future contracting outweighs the short-
term gain associated with default. However, in times 
of “stress,” which can be characterized by either large 
price movements and/or weakened balance sheets, the 
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For example, if there is a huge price movement, a 
counterparty may find it in its best interest to avoid 
taking a large loss today, even though it will be unable 
to enter into a contract in the future. (And this may be 
the case even when the reneging counterparty has a 
strong balance sheet and the resources to perform.) 
Alternatively, if a counterparty has a weak balance 
sheet, fulfilling a contractual obligation may make the 
firm insolvent or vulnerable, whereas reneging will 
allow it to “live” for another day or become stronger. 
Faced with these choices, the counterparty may choose 
to strategically default. It is important to emphasize that 
during stressful times, parties that anticipate receiving 
positive contractual payments are really counting on 
their counterparties to perform. Yet, it is precisely at 
such times that a counterparty is most likely to (strate-
gically) default.5 If, from a social perspective, it is im-
portant to mitigate contractual defaults during times 
of stress, then we know from the earlier example that 
performance can be enhanced if collateral is posted 
with the CCP. Hence, even though parties will perform 
on their contractual obligations in the absence of posting 
collateral in most circumstances, a CCP will still emerge 
and require counterparties to post collateral. The reason 
is that performance is particularly important to counter-
parties (and society) during times of stress, but this is 
a time when their counterparties may not care about 
their reputations and may strategically default.6
The above discussion implies that when there is 
a commitment friction, a CCP may emerge to enhance 
performance even though counterparties care about 
their reputations. 
Risk management
In practice, CCPs devote considerable resources 
to risk management. Unfortunately, the example I in-
troduced earlier is too stylized to illustrate the notion 
of risk management because the CCP does not face any 
risk. In the example, the size of the CCP’s collateral 
holdings eliminates the risk that it will fail to perform 
in the event that one of the counterparties fails to per-
form. The CCP holds $10: $5 from the farmer and $5 
from the baker. In the event that either the farmer or 
baker defaults, the CCP needs $5 to guarantee perfor-
mance, which it has. In the real world, however, prices 
of goods or assets do not move in nice, finite, discrete 
amounts over a specific time interval. Although short-
term price movements are typically not that large in 
relative terms, one can’t rule out enormous price move-
ments over a period of a few hours. One can imagine 
modifying the example to allow for a continuous dis-
tribution of spot prices characterized by low probabilities 
of large price movements. In that case, the CCP can 
only guarantee performance if it holds enormous amounts 
of collateral. But this particular solution to the perfor-
mance problem may not be an attractive one. Posting 
collateral is costly for counterparties, as they have more 
productive uses for their resources. If a CCP demands 
huge amounts of collateral—so as to guarantee perfor-
mance for any conceivable price movement—then the 
farmer and baker may simply stop using forward con-
tracts. In this situation, forward contracts would become 
extremely costly to use. The farmer and baker may 
therefore prefer to transact on spot markets and face the 
(lower cost) price risk. This is where risk management 
comes in.
The CCP can economize on collateral by “guaran-
teeing” performance with a high probability (but less 
than one). So, although there is a possibility that the 
CCP will default on its obligations, it minimizes this 
possibility by managing the risk of failure that it faces. 
A CCP can do this by, for example, requiring adjust-
ments to collateral when it perceives that risk has 
changed and making provisions for additional resources 
should its collateral holdings prove to be insufficient 
to cover a default by one of its counterparties. I will 
now develop these ideas a bit further. 
The amount of collateral that counterparties post 
can depend on a number of things. It can depend on 
the volatility of the price of the commodity or assets 
that underlie the derivative contract.7 There is a posi-
tive relationship between the volatility of the price of 
the underlying asset and the volatility of the value of 
the derivative contract. If the underlying asset has low 
price volatility, then it will require less collateral than 
an underlying asset with high price volatility. The idea 
here is that if a counterparty fails, then, on average, a 
low-price-volatility underlying asset will require a smaller 
amount of the CCP’s resources to ensure contractual 
performance than a high-price-volatility underlying 
asset. Also, if the price volatility of the underlying asset 
changes over time, then so should the amount of collateral 
that counterparties post with the CCP. For example, if 
the volatility decreases, the CCP will transfer some of the 
collateral back to the counterparty; if it increases, then 
it will require additional collateral from the counterparty. 
For longer-lived derivative securities, the value of 
a particular position will change over time. For example, 
if the price of the underlying asset, say, wheat, in a 
forward contract increases over time, then the value of 
the forward contract for the counterparty who delivers 
it, the farmer, falls, since he is delivering an asset 
whose value is much greater than the delivery price. 
If this counterparty fails to deliver, then the CCP faces 
a very high performance cost. The CCP can eliminate 
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to settle these liabilities on a periodic basis. That is, the 
CCP marks-to-market its contracts—directly passing 
resources from counterparties whose contracts have 
lost value to those whose contracts have gained value.
The amount of collateral required by the CCP 
can also depend upon the “liquidity” of the contracts 
it novates. In practice, if a counterparty defaults, the 
CCP sells the defaulting counterparty’s positions. If a 
position is “liquid,” it can be sold quickly and at a low 
cost. For example, contracts that are exchange traded 
and cleared, such as futures contracts, are very liquid.8 
The market provides a fairly accurate estimate of the 
value of a position, and even a very large position can 
be sold to the market over a relatively short period. 
On the other hand, specialized OTC derivative contracts 
are much less liquid because their estimated value is 
subject to great variation and they are traded on a bi-
lateral basis. Hence, it may be difficult to sell a large 
position of OTC contracts on short notice at a price that 
is at or near their estimated value. Since less liquid 
contracts are more costly to trade than liquid ones, a 
CCP will require higher collateral for OTC contracts.
The CCP may have access to resources other than 
collateral to help it facilitate contractual performance 
in the event of a counterparty failure. The CCP may 
require all of its members, that is, members that have 
their contracts novated by the CCP, to contribute to a 
guarantee fund. Members make this contribution when 
they join the CCP, before the CCP novates any of their 
contracts. This fund could be accessed in the event a 
member defaults and its collateral is insufficient to 
guarantee performance. (This happens when the value 
of the defaulting member’s portfolio—which includes 
current payments—plus the value of the member’s collat-
eral is negative.) Such an arrangement is sometimes 
called loss mutualization, because losses are shared or 
mutualized among the nondefaulting or surviving mem-
bers. If the defaulting member’s collateral and the entire 
guarantee fund are insufficient for the CCP to perform, 
then the CCP members’ agreement may require them 
to provide additional resources to ensure performance. 
Except for the requirement that members provide 
additional resources in the event of a member default, 
the risk-management strategies described above are 
consistent with the commitment and informational fric-
tions. That is, contributions to the guarantee fund, the 
posting of collateral, and marking-to-market represent 
various payments that members make and receive that 
are designed to enhance commitment. Importantly, these 
payments are made before any default occurs. The re-
quirement to provide additional resources in the event 
of a member’s default is subject to a commitment fric-
tion. Since the additional payment to the CCP occurs 
after a default, members may choose to honor their 
promises or not. In particular, in times of stress, members 
may choose not to honor their promises because the 
benefit associated with being a CCP member in the 
future is less than the resources they have to sacrifice 
today. The analysis regarding whether members will 
contribute extra resources to a CCP after a member 
defaults is the same as in the farmer–baker example in 
the previous section, “Commitment and reputation.”
To summarize, risk management is an important 
element of the clearing process because the CCP’s perfor-
mance guarantee is only as good as its risk-management 
strategy. Risk-management strategies, such as marking-
to-market, making contributions to a guarantee fund, 
and adjusting collateral holdings when perceived risk 
changes, are consistent with the commitment friction. 
The structure of central counterparties
In practice, a CCP has a set of members. Only 
members can clear contracts with the CCP. That is, a 
CCP novates only those contacts that are presented by 
its members. Counterparties that are not members of a 
CCP—let’s call them customers—have their contracts 
novated by a CCP member. In this arrangement, the CCP 
guarantees contractual performance for its members, 
and a CCP member guarantees contractual performance 
for its customers. Hence, there is a tiered, but separated, 
relationship between customers, CCP members, and 
the CCP. There is no direct contractual relationship 
between the CCP and customers. 
If a clearing member defaults on its contractual 
obligations with the CCP, the CCP guarantees perfor-
mance of the defaulting member’s contracts. That is, 
the CCP will perform its contractual obligations for all 
of its nondefaulting or surviving CCP members. As a 
result, all surviving CCP members will be able to per-
form their contractual obligations with their customers 
and the CCP. It must be pointed out, however, that the 
CCP guarantee does not (typically) extend to customers 
of a defaulting CCP member. Since customers’ contracts 
are guaranteed by CCP members, they effectively lose 
any performance guarantee when the entity that guaran-
teed performance for them—the defaulting member—
no longer exists.9
Just as in the farmer–baker example, CCP mem-
bers post collateral with the CCP, and customers post 
collateral with CCP members. So, the collateral that 
CCP members post with the CCP can come from their 
customers or from the members directly for contracts 
that they entered into on their own account. 
A clearing member is responsible for the perfor-
mance of the contracts that it brings to the CCP. So, if 
a customer defaults on its contractual obligation to a 143 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
CCP member, the member must step in and ensure 
performance or be in default with the CCP. Effectively, 
the defaulting customer’s contracts become the con-
tracts of the member. The CCP member, however, does 
not have to hold onto the contracts associated with 
the defaulting customer as part of its portfolio; the 
member can always sell them. In either case, the CCP 
member will receive the collateral that was posted for 
the defaulting customer’s position. If the collateral 
requirements were appropriately calculated, then they 
should cover both the payments made by the member 
and any losses associated with either holding or selling 
the defaulting customer’s position. If, for some reason, 
the collateral is insufficient to cover the losses, the 
CCP member must absorb the losses or be in default 
to the CCP. The member will typically be willing to 
absorb these losses for the same reason as the farmer 
is willing to deliver wheat to the baker at $10 when 
the spot price is $15 in the absence of collateral. The 
member values the future benefit associated with being 
a CCP member more than the short-term benefit of 
walking away from the losses. In times of stress, 
however, a CCP member may choose to default on its 
performance obligations. 
Debate about central counterparty 
membership
At the heart of the debate over CCP membership 
criteria is the liquidity of OTC contracts. The debate 
can be loosely characterized as follows. One side be-
lieves that because OTC contracts are not very liquid, 
a CCP member must be able to assume the portfolio 
of a defaulting member. This necessarily implies that 
members must have significant capital (typically at 
least $5 billion) available for clearing purposes. The 
other side believes that the illiquidity of OTC deriva-
tives is overstated; for example, OTC interest rate 
derivatives and credit default swaps are quite liquid. 
If a CCP member defaults, then there are methods avail-
able to dispose of the portfolio, other than requiring 
another member to purchase it. And finally, if a require-
ment for membership is significant financial resources, 
then membership will be limited to a very small set of 
financial institutions, which in turn could give these 
institutions undue market power. I examine these views, 
starting at the heart of the debate: liquidity.
Contracts are said to be liquid if the value, or “fair 
price,” of the contract can be accurately determined on 
an ongoing basis and large amounts of contracts can be 
bought or sold at or near the fair price in a short period.
A CCP adopts risk-management strategies to en-
hance its performance guarantee. These strategies—
such as collateralizing positions, marking-to-market, 
and disposing of a defaulting member’s portfolio—are 
easier to implement when contracts are liquid. The 
amount of collateral posted depends, in part, on the 
volatility of the price of the underlying asset and of the 
value of the OTC contract. Higher volatility implies 
that more collateral should be posted, and changes in 
volatility imply that the amount of collateral posted 
should also change. When contracts are liquid, good 
estimates for levels of volatility can be obtained. The 
CCP can be reasonably assured that the process of 
periodically marking-to-market members’ positions 
will not leave the CCP with additional liabilities in the 
event of a member’s default when contracts are liquid. 
Since large positions can be sold quickly at or near 
the fair price when contracts are liquid, the CCP will 
be able to efficiently dispose of a defaulting member’s 
portfolio. A final risk-management strategy, contribu-
tions to a guarantee fund, provides an additional buffer 
for the CCP against losses from a member’s default. 
The size of a member’s contribution determines the 
maximum notional value of contracts (or risk) that the 
member can bring to the CCP.
If all contracts were liquid, there would be no debate 
associated with CCP membership. Any counterparty 
that could post the required collateral for its positions 
and contribute to a guarantee fund would be able to 
become a member. 
Because some contracts are not very liquid, however, 
any sensible risk-management strategy, independent of 
the structure of membership, will require higher levels 
of collateral from CCP members. 
An important aspect of guaranteeing performance 
is the CCP’s ability to sell a defaulting member’s port-
folio quickly, at or near the fair price.10 When contracts 
are highly liquid, the CCP does this by simply selling 
the portfolio to the market. What can the CCP do when 
the contracts are not very liquid and there is no market 
to sell to? One side of the debate over CCP member-
ship says the solution is to require each CCP member 
to assume, that is, purchase, part of the defaulting mem-
ber’s portfolio. Since the notional value of a defaulting 
member’s portfolio may be quite large, a CCP member 
will require substantial capital to assume its share. 
Hence, this solution would restrict CCP membership 
to those who possess significant capital that can be 
used for clearing purposes.
There may be problems associated with this solu-
tion. Because of the significant capital requirement for 
membership, the number of individuals or institutions 
that can qualify for membership will be small. This 
implies that the amount of liquidity that can be brought 
into the clearing process is limited (by the wealth of the 
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importantly, if there is only a small number of clearing 
members, then they could use the resulting market power 
to adversely influence the pricing of clearing services 
and the pricing of the OTC contracts themselves.
If a clearing member defaults, one side of the debate 
advocates that the CCP auction the defaulting mem-
ber’s portfolio among a small number of institutions, 
the CCP members. Auctions share many of the desir-
able properties associated with exchanges or markets, 
such as price discovery and a place that brings buyers 
together with a seller. In other words, an auction can 
provide (some) liquidity for the objects that are being 
sold. But it is neither clear nor obvious why the auc-
tion would operate more efficiently from society’s 
point of view if it is restricted to only “wealthy” bidders. 
Since a CCP also serves as an information warehouse—
collecting and disseminating the prices of cleared 
contracts—this information could be used by anyone, 
that is, a CCP member or nonmember, who would like 
to bid on part or all of the defaulting member’s port-
folio. Opening up the auction to nonmembers would 
make more liquidity available to the clearing process. 
(Of course, if a nonmember purchases part of the port-
folio, then those contracts would have to be cleared 
through a CCP member.) There does not appear to be 
a rationale to limit the sale of a defaulting member’s 
portfolio to only (wealthy) clearing members.
Another problem created by the wealth restriction 
for membership lies in the pricing of products. There 
is always a public policy concern regarding the pricing 
and supply of services when the number of service 
providers—in our case, CCP members—is small. That 
is, prices will be too high and quantities will be too 
low. Perhaps a bigger potential problem is that since 
CCP members are free to choose their customers, they 
may choose to clear only those OTC contracts for 
which they are direct counterparties, thereby limiting 
competition in the OTC derivative markets.11 Hence, 
the wealth restrictions for CCP membership, which are 
motivated by clearing considerations, can have adverse 
affects on the pricing of the OTC derivative contracts. 
Ironically, the wealth restriction could ultimately pre-
vent these contracts from become more liquid.
The wealth restriction for membership seems arti-
ficial. As long as an institution can cover the risk that 
it brings into the CCP, by providing appropriate levels 
of collateral and making contributions to the guarantee 
fund, there does not appear to be any reason to exclude 
it from membership. In an unrestricted membership 
environment, CCP members would compete for cus-
tomers by appropriately pricing their services. With this 
structure, there would not be any obstacles to clearing 
all “clearable” contracts (not just those for which a 
member is a counterparty) or moving current OTC 
contracts onto exchanges. Exchange trading would 
improve both the liquidity of the contracts and the 
CCP’s performance.
In summary, restricting CCP membership limits the 
amount of liquidity in the clearing process. In addition, 
membership restrictions can have adverse affects on 
the provision and pricing of both clearing services 
and OTC contracts.
End-user exemptions
“Since we weren’t part of the problem, we shouldn’t 
have to pay.” This statement nicely summarizes the 
sentiment of many nonfinancial corporate end-users 
of OTC derivative products regarding that part of the 
Dodd–Frank legislation that mandates clearing for 
most OTC derivative contracts.
In most cases, nonfinancial corporations purchase 
OTC derivative contracts to hedge their business risks. 
These contracts are attractive because, unlike exchange-
traded derivative contracts, they can be tailored to the 
firm’s business needs (for example, in terms of timing 
of payments). Because these firms are using the con-
tracts for hedging rather than speculative purposes, 
they usually hold onto them until they expire. 
Currently, if a nonfinancial corporation wants to 
purchase an OTC derivative, such as a swap, it nego-
tiates the terms directly with a dealer. The dealer typically 
does not require the nonfinancial firm to post collateral. 
However, the firm does pay a premium over similar 
products that require the buyer to post collateral. Non-
financial firms claim that a requirement that all OTC 
contracts be centrally cleared will raise their cost of 
hedging, because they will now be required to post 
collateral. These firms argue that since they use the 
contracts to hedge their business risks and, by and 
large, they did not default on their derivative contracts 
during the financial crisis, they should not have to 
bear this cost.12 
I conclude that, even in the best case scenario, the 
cost of hedging for nonfinancial corporate end-users 
will increase when their contracts are cleared. In the best-
case scenario, the dealer posts collateral and the end-
user does not. This is the best-case scenario from an 
end-user’s perspective, because it does not have to post 
collateral. I now provide the details for this scenario. 
Suppose that the dealer that negotiates the corporate 
end-user’s swap has a large diversified portfolio of 
end-users. As well, assume that corporate end-users will 
never (strategically) default on their swap obligations. 
That is, whenever end-users make the calculation, the 
benefit associated with continued access to the swap 
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payment. Hence, the only time an end-user defaults on 
a swap payment is when it is insolvent (or bankrupt). 
If one assumes that the probability of a firm becoming 
insolvent is independently distributed across firms,13 
then the dealer understands that a certain proportion 
of its swap contracts will end up in default. The dealer 
can charge a premium that reflects the proportion of swap 
contracts that will fail. From the end-user’s perspective, 
this can be interpreted as an insurance premium. A 
default by an end-user will not create any problems for 
the broker-dealer since defaults are anticipated and 
priced. In this ideal world—where end-users never have 
an incentive to strategically default and (nonstrategic) 
defaults are uncorrelated—end-users do not have to 
post any collateral. Note that this result is consistent 
with my “simple” model of clearing, where collateral 
was required to guarantee performance because either 
the farmer or baker would always have an incentive 
to strategically default. 
Prior to the recent financial crisis, the dealer typically 
would not have been required to post collateral for its 
positions with the end-user. Most of the time, dealers 
would contractually perform because it was in their 
best interests to do so. However, in times of stress, the 
dealer might default on its swap obligations. As a result, 
the end-user would not receive any payment—which 
may be critical during times of stress—and would be 
one of many creditors seeking remedy from the dealer. 
Clearly, contractual performance would be enhanced if 
the OTC contracts were cleared by having dealers post 
collateral for their positions with corporate end-users. 
But posting collateral is not cheap. When dealers 
post collateral for their swap contracts with corporate 
end-users (as mandated by the Dodd–Frank legislation), 
they will pass some proportion—possibly all—of the 
associated cost to the end-users. Therefore, even if cor-
porate end-users do not post collateral for their positions, 
their cost of hedging will increase. 
Up to this point, I have assumed that corporate end-
users don’t strategically default and that defaults by 
nonfinancial firms are uncorrelated. These assumptions 
are unrealistic. In times of stress, when there are large 
price movements and/or weakened balance sheets, end-
users may find it in their best interests to strategically 
default on a swap payment, even though they have 
the resources to pay. If many end-users default, then 
the insurance premium that dealers charged them will 
be insufficient to cover the dealers’ losses. If, from a 
social perspective, it is important that dealers do not 
experience large-scale loses on their swap contracts 
during times of stress, then end-users’ swap positions 
should be properly cleared through a CCP, which will 
require them to post collateral. 
Although nonfinancial firms, by and large, purchase 
OTC contracts for the purpose of hedging, it is not at 
all obvious that these entities do not pose a threat to the 
stability of the financial system. Nonfinancial corporate 
end-users represent a relatively large share of the OTC 
market, 10 percent to 15 percent. If these firms receive 
a correlated shock that weakens their ability to perform, 
they may transmit this adverse shock to the balance 
sheets of the dealers. The potential effects of this shock 
can be greatly mitigated by requiring them to post 
collateral for their positions.
Conclusion
In the first part of this article, I sketched out a frame-
work for thinking about clearing. I used the insights 
from this framework to examine two prominent themes 
from a recent symposium on clearing. In terms of CCP 
membership, there is an alternative (unrestricted) CCP 
structure that is at least as effective as one that requires 
members to have substantial capital. The alternative 
structure has the added benefit (which could be huge) 
of promoting both competition and the provision of 
liquidity in clearing and in the OTC derivatives markets. 
In terms of end-user exemptions, the cost of hedging 
will increase for end-users even if they are not required 
to post collateral. Since end-users’ positions are non-
trivial, in the sense that (correlated) defaults by end-
users can weaken the ability of their dealers to perform, 
they should post collateral in order to strengthen dealers’ 
ability to perform.146 4Q/2011, Economic Perspectives
1Derivatives are financial contracts whose value is linked to the price 
of an underlying commodity, asset, rate, index, or the occurrence or 
magnitude of an event. These contracts are traded both on traditional 
exchanges and over the counter.
2In 2008, the notional value of all AIG’s derivative contracts, including 
credit default swaps, was as high as $2.7 trillion.
3See www.freakonomicsmedia.com/2008/09/18/diamond-and-kashyap- 
on-the-recent-financial-upheavals/ for a helpful Q&A about the  
financial market disruption in late 2008.
4The symposium agenda is available at www.chicagofed.org/webpages/ 
events/2010/public_policy_symposium_on_OTC_derivatives_
clearing.cfm.
5Some people argue that large companies do not strategically default 
because the reputational cost is too great. So, if these companies do 
default, it is because they are either bankrupt or insolvent. But, if a 
company senses it may become insolvent, it may attempt to counteract 
this by taking defensive actions such as rescheduling debt and other 
payments in an attempt to save itself. One can interpret this as strate-
gically defaulting—the company has the resources to pay current 
bills, but chooses to withhold these payments.
6We observe this in the context of sovereign debt. For example, a 
country has the resources to pay for debt, but chooses not to because 
the current costs of doing so are too high, say, because the country 
would have to increase taxes on its citizens when the economy is 
weak. This is a costly decision—when a country repudiates debt 
payments, its reputation will take a hit, in the sense that it will be 
shunned in international debt markets in the foreseeable future.
7In the earlier example, the derivative contract is a forward contract 
and the commodity that underlies the derivative contract is wheat. 
8A measure of liquidity for exchange-traded contracts is the bid–ask 
spread. A low bid–ask spread indicates that the contract is liquid; a 
high bid–ask spread indicates that it is not very liquid.
9If the customers’ collateral payments are segregated from the member’s 
own collateral and the member defaults on its own positions, then 
the customers’ collateral is protected. In practice, customers of the 
defaulting member would transfer their accounts to one or more 
nondefaulting members, who then can “novate” the customer con-
tracts of the defaulting member. 
10The CCP may be able to avoid receiving a low selling price if addi-
tional time is taken to sell the position. There are two possible prob-
lems, however. First, there is a chance that the price of the contracts 
can move against the CCP during a protracted selling period. This 
implies that the CCP would require additional collateral from its 
members. Second, the CCP may not have the luxury of time on its 
side to dispose of the portfolio.
11If a clearing member buys or sells a contract from customer A, then 
I say that customer A is a direct counterparty of the clearing member. 
If customer A buys or sells a contract from customer B, a clearing 
member can limit competition by choosing not to novate the contracts. 
12However, there have been defaults by nonfinancial firms that dis-
rupted the broader markets—for example, Enron.
13This assumption is almost certainly false, that is, insolvencies will 
be correlated. I make this assumption because it provides the best-
case scenario for the corporate end-user. Later, I discuss the impli-
cations of relaxing this assumption.
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